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New Challenges to Investor's Counsel:
Legal Risk Analysis and the Work-Out
Perspective in LDC Investment
ALLEN P.K. KEESEE*
INTRODUCTION
It has been well and often noted that while legal considera-
tions are but one of many factors that determine whether a
given locale is an appropriate investment situs, such considera-
tions are among the most important in making such a decision.
Many elements, of diverse character, contribute to the formation of a
country's investment climate. There are political, psychological, cul-
tural and other elements involved. Strictly legal elements are also
present, and most of the other elements directly affect the foreign
investor through legal forms and mechanisms. Moreover,. . . in order
to effect any short-run change in a country's investment climate, legal
means have to be used.'
It is quite correct to assert that "the firm's basic need is to
determine the best strategy for generating a profit over the
* B.A. Yale University, 1968; J.D. Harvard Law School 1972; Associate,
Simpson, Thatcher & Bartlett 1972-1975. Presently, counsel, Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC). OPIC is an agency of the United States Gov-
ernment organized in January, 1971 to stimulate private capital investment
in developing nations; to make direct loans in either local currencies or in U.S.
dollars and in the financing of pre-investment surveys; to offer insurance
against currency in convertibility, expropriations, and damages from war, revo-
lution and insurrection; and to provide U.S. lenders protection against commer-
cial and political risk by guaranteeing repayment of principal and interest on
loans made to eligible investors.
1. A. Fatouros, Legal Security for International Investments, LEGAL As-
PECTS' or FOREIGN INVESTMENT 699 (W. Friedman 1959).
relevant time horizon, not to gain maximum legal security per
se, and that legal counsel should be employed in a consulting
capacity, not as the final architect of a business relationship."2
Nevertheless, when financial risk analysis has "cleared" the
project and political risk analysis has "cleared" the country, it is
the attainment of that very "legal security per se" which as-
sumes paramount importance and which it is the responsibility
of investor's counsel to provide.
It is the premise of this article that for two reasons in particu-
lar the role of counsel in aiding entities making investments in
non-oil, less-developed countries ("LDC's") has recently be-
come, and will increasingly be, significantly more pivotal than it
has been heretofore. Those reasons, it is posited, are that (i) in
the fundamental bilateral monopoly3 condition of virtually all
2. R. ROBINSON, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MANAGEMENT: A GUIDE TO DECI-
SION MAKING, 529 (1973).
3. A concise recapitulation of the main elements of bilateral monopoly
appears in the draft edition of Abbott, Bargaining Power and Strategy in the
Foreign Investment Process: A Current Andean Code Analysis, 3 SYRACUSE J.
OF INT'L L. AND COM. 319 (1975), in the author's files:
The theory of bilateral monopoly emphasizes the bargaining process
involved in foreign direct investment. The bilateral monopoly model
focuses on the two major participants involved in the investment proc-
ess-the foreign investor and the host government. Each of these partici-
pants has a greater or lesser degree of monopoly control over a certain
set of resources which the other considers desirable; and the two partici-
pants engage in a bargaining process to determine how these resources
will be used and how the product of using these resources-such as
profits-will be divided. The outcome of the bargaining process is a set
of 'conditions of entry' or rules which the host country government and
foreign investor agree to abide by.
The bilateral monopoly model has certain important limitations
which must be spelled out. The model focuses on the two major partici-
pants in the bargaining process while relegating other participants to a
secondary role. These other participants who can and do affect the
outcome of the bargaining process include the home country govern-
ment of the foreign investor which can increase or reduce the attractive-
ness of an investment by changing the home country tax laws; local
entrepreneurs in the host country who may be involved in a partial-
ownership arrangement; or foreign investors from other countries who
may be willing to undertake the same investment. A thorough analysis
will of course attempt to show how these additional factors may effect
the outcome of the bargaining process.
The foreign investor approaches the developing country with a cer-
tain set of desirable resources. This usually includes a combination of
financial capital or access to such capital, technology which has been
acquired through research and development abroad, management
skills, and access to international markets. Depending on the nature of
the investment involved, the investor has greater or lesser monopoly
control over the resources at his disposal. The extreme examples of a
firm which possesses monopoly control over desirable resources is IBM.
If a country wants to be the site of a plant which produces the most
advanced computers or computer components, it has the choice of
either accepting IBM or foregoing its desire and instead acquiring a
second or third rate computer firm. In this situation, IBM is to a great
extent free to dictate its own terms of entry. On the other hand, in the
automobile industry there are a large number of firms with home of-
fices in several countries with substantially equivalent access to technol-
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LDC/MNC 4 relationships, the balance of power has shifted
away from the MNC's; and that (ii) the ongoing accumulation of
large OPEC5 petro-surpluses in addition to the virtual exhaus-
tion by 1976 of LDC credit lines has laid the foundation for the
creation of an LDC "mega-deficit" condition which will further
destabilize the LDC/MNC bilateral monopoly structure. Given
ogy, capital and management. When the representative from General
Motors approaches the authorities of a developing country, both he and
the authorities of that country know that GM does not possess a great
degree of monopoly control over the resources of the automotive indus-
try. Thus, if GM does not want to establish a plant, perhaps Ford, Fiat,
or Toyota will. Because of this lack of monopoly control, the representa-
tive from GM faces a much different bargaining situation than his
colleagues at IBM. He must be prepared to enter the foreign country on
terms which are less than ideal if he is to be permitted to enter at all.
The country which the foreign investor wishes to enter also possesses
monopoly control over certain resources to a greater or lesser degree.
Primarily these are access either to certain natural resources or market
areas. At the extreme in the host country perspective are the oil produc-
ing countries which possess a valuable resource not easily obtainable in
many geographical areas. Likewise, certain countries such as Brazil
offer large populations and high growth economies which are extremely
attractive to producers of consumer products. The oil producing
countries and the countries with very attractive consumer markets are
able to place restrictions on entry which are far less than ideal and still
be able to attract foreign investors. On the other hand, countries with
relatively small populations or low average incomes or few natural
resources have little to offer other than possibly low wage rates for
export producers. These countries are not in a position to place heavy
demands on foreign investors without losing investments altogether.
The outcome of the bargaining process depends on the monopoly
strength of the parties. The more desirable the resources of one of the
parties and the more effective the party's control over these resources,
the more likely is the agreement to be weighted in his favor. The agree-
ment between the parties can take the form either of a contractual
agreement which will specify the terms which the parties have agreed
on; or may consist only of the investor's acquiescence to the established
standards of the host country (typically set forth in a foreign investment
law).
A full exposition of the theory may be found in R. VERNON, RESTRICTIVE Busi-
NESS PRACTICES: THE OPERATIONS OF MULTINATIONAL UNITED STATES ENTER-
PRISES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, U.N. publication E. 72 II.D.16 (1972), and C.
KINDELBERGER, AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD, chs. 1 & 4 (1969).
4. The terms "investor," foreign investor," and "MNC" (multinational
corporation) are used interchangeably herein. The terms refer to any entity
which invests, whether through debt or equity, in any LDC, whether in the
public or private sector. They thus include entities ranging from commercial
banks lending to foreign governments or to foreign branches of US companies,
to contractors joint-venturing with private overseas partners or themselves
making the entire capital and technological investment in a private project.
5. The "Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries" was established
in 1960 and currently maintains its headquarters in Vienna, Austria. As of May,
1977 its membership was composed of Algeria, Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia,
Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Quatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emi-
rates, and Venezuela.
the propensity of bank lending standards to vary in inverse
proportion to liquidity, and given the condition of hyper-liq-
uidity which petro-earnings promote, there is no reason to be-
lieve that lending activity, whether balance-of-payments or pro-
ject oriented, will soon abate. 6 Similarly, given the pressure on
public corporations to compile respectable earnings records
and given their tendency to undertake LDC projects and co-
ventures whenever and wherever attractive manufacturing,
mining, or assembly opportunities surface, there is little reason
to believe that that sort of incremental investment will decline
below the relatively low level, as compared to the 1960's, to
which it has already descended.
The ultimate consequence of this continued debt and equity
investment in the context of a deteriorating LDC financial envi-
ronment seems virtually certain to be the confrontation of in-
vestors and their counsel with a significantly larger number of
"work-out ' 7 situations than they faced in pre-mega-deficit
years. This prospect, in turn, imposes new responsibilities on
investor's counsel and requires him to refocus his attention
away from his traditional concern with negotiating for his client
the best possible deal-entry terms and onto the question of de-
veloping for his client the best safeguards against work-out
contingencies. It calls, in essence, for a shift from what might be
termed a "front-end perspective" to what might be termed a
"work-out" perspective.
6. See, Davis, How Risky is International Lending, 1-2 HARV. Bus. REV.
135 (1977):
Given the need to cover overhead, to provide a justification for their
existence, and to build a base of earnings assets, business development
teams from literally thousands of offices, owned by hundreds of banks,
are seeking lending opportunities. While a sharp reassessment of risk
and reward took place in 1974 as a result of the collapse of Bankhaus
Herstatt and other serious losses, the same competitive pressures on
loan margins, maturities, and credit quality which characterized the
buyer's market for international credit in 1973, are present in 1977 ...
With few exceptions, the most significant overseas losses have been
incurred in real estate, tanker finance, and the occasional corporate
credit. Bad management-usually in the form of overexpansion, will-
ingly assisted by eager bankers-lies behind a very large proportion of
the losses .... [I]n many cases it was the bankers' willingness-if not
enthusiasm-to provide funds for a property developer, tanker owner,
or national development program which created a debt service level
that the borrower could not meet when the worldwide recession
struck....
7. The term "work out" as used herein refers to any process, or procedure,
including negotiation, rescheduling, arbitration, and litigation, not initiated
voluntarily by the investor but rather necessitated by the fact that the invest-
ment recipient or guarantor had breached, or appeared likely to breach, the
original terms of the investment. The term would thus include the investor's
response to defaults; currency blockage; expropriation; violations of guaran-
ties, mortgages, and negative covenants; and breaches of any other type of
investment agreement, guaranty, contract or undertaking.
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This paper will attempt first to demonstrate that because of
intrastructural changes in the LDCIMNC relationship and the
prospect of particularly extreme LDC balance-of-payments
problems in the future, there is over the near-to-mid-term a
strong probability that most LDC investments will at some
stage of their life cycle experience a work-out phase. The heigh-
tened, as opposed to diminished, role of investor's counsel will
be noted, and four specific areas-local counsel, local law, docu-
mentation and collateral-will be reviewed to indicate how
counsel, in his new role, can neutralize certain risks which are
likely to arise in the work-out context. Emphasis will be on
illustration of approach in these areas, rather than on exhaus-
tive enumeration of specific recommendations.
THE WORK OUT PERSPECTIVE AND U.S. COUNSEL PERCEPTIONS
The quest for security per se under conditions of work-out
anticipation must be grounded in counsel's conviction that
work-out is, in fact, a real probability.
Counsel's convictions in this area are critical since the per-
spective he imports into a deal at its inception will impinge upon
virtually every detail of the investment structuring and docu-
mentation, and so have a substantial cumulative impact upon
the shape of the ultimate agreement. It has been correctly ob-
served that "a contract is truly read only when a dispute arises
and every word [may then be deemed] of doubtful application
" 8
If, then, an investment agreement, when truly read in the
context of a work-out dispute, is to meet the test of close
scrutiny and provide real security to the investor, it must be
drafted by counsel from a perspective which recognizes the
high probability that work-out problems will, " fact, arise.
It is particularly important that this point be recognized une-
quivocally by counsel since there are pressures which could
lead counsel to de-emphasize the effort to achieve investment
security if its overriding importance were not clear to him. Two
such pressures are the possible doubts on the part of the inves-
tor as to the need for elaborate work-out-oriented security pre-
cautions; and the tradeoffs, in terms of yield maximization and
8. H. DE VRIES, FOREIGN LAW AND THE AMERICAN LAWYER 39 (1969).
the attainment of other desirable return-oriented contract pro-
visions, that may have to be made if the other party to the
agreement is to be induced to accept the security arrangements
proposed by investor's counsel.
The following discussion of the mega-deficit and destabilized
monopoly syndromes is intended to substantiate the premises
that work-out difficulties are in fact quite likely to arise; that
work-out scenarios are likely to become investor's counsel's
prime concern in the mega-deficit era; and that adoption of a
work-out perspective is a necessary response to that devel-
opment.
The Mega-Deficit
The extent of OPEC reserve accumulation over the 1973-1977
period has been widely publicized and extensively discussed.9
Virtually no responsible commentator has attempted to gainsay
the fact that such accumulation has caused substantial LDC
payments deficits to date and is likely to continue to have that
effect into the foreseeable future. But what has been said in an
attempt, perhaps, to find some semblance of a silver lining in
what is a very grey cloud indeed, is that the commercial banking
sector has done an excellent petro-surplus recycling job; chang-
ing patterns of OPEC import procurement will benefit LDC's as
well as OECD 0 countries and will ameliorate the mega-deficit
problem to some extent; and standby arrangements such as the
Witteveen Facility" will "tide over" the LDC's, and the few
9. See, P. ODELL, OIL AND WORLD POWER: BACKGROUND TO THE OIL CRISIS,
(3d ed. 1974) esp. ch. 7; J. LEVY CONSULTANTS CORPORATION, FUTURE OPEC
ACCUMULATION OF OIL MONEY: A NEW LOOK AT A CRUCIAL PROBLEM (N.Y. June
1975); The OPEC Surplus, WORLD FINANCIAL MKTS. (Morgan Guaranty Trust
Company, March 1976), at 10; and Id. May 1976, at 5.
10. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development was
established under a Convention signed in Paris on the 14th of December 1960.
Its present membership includes Australia, New Zealand, Japan, the United
Kingdom, Ireland, Iceland, Canada, the United States, Norway, Sweden, Fin-
land, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Turkey, Greece, Italy, Au-
stria, Switzerland, The Netherlands, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Spain and
Portugal. The OECD's primary function is the coordination of economic policy
among member states.
11. The Witteveen Facility is a supplementary financing facility of the In-
ternational Monetary Fund. The Executive Directors of the IMF have approved
the establishment of the Witteveen Facility to make available financial re-
sources to nations with serious balance-of-payments problems. Thirteen na-
tions, including the United States, have indicated their readiness to make funds
available for this Facility. The total resources of the Facility are expected to be
approximately $10 billion dollars. (Witteveen Report, infra, note 14). The prob-
able United States contribution to the Facility will equal 1.45 billion Special
Drawing Rights, or approximately 1.7 billion dollars. As of this writing, the IMF
had agreed upon terms and conditions of borrowing with the creditor nations
and of lending with prospective debtor nations. IMF-Creditor bilateral agree-
310
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needy OECD's like Britain and Italy "until conditions
improve."' 2
Unfortunately, what does not appear to have been fully ap-
preciated as of this writing is that there does not appear to be
any realistic scenario according to which "conditions" will in
fact improve.
Any foreseeable abatement in the size of the OPEC, or more
accurately, the Kuwaiti-Quatari-Saudi-Emirates, petro-surplus
is insignificant at best. For 1977, for example, the surplus fell
only $3 billion from the $38 billion figure for 1976.13 For the 1978-
80 period the prognosis is for a cumulative deficit on the order
of $220 billion, with virtually all of the surplus side of the ac-
count accruing to the Gulf States, and approximately 40% of the
deficit being born by the LDC's. 14
While private commercial banks have funded almost exactly
75% of the $225 billion cumulative oil deficit run-up in the three-
year period of 1974-76,15 clear signals have been emitted by the
private financial sector to the effect that the banks have neither
the desire nor the capability to continue in that role after 1977.16
ments are awaiting creditor execution. The Facility will become operative upon
the execution of bilateral agreements pledging at least 7.75 billion Special Draw-
ing Rights.
12. For expressions of this relatively optimistic view of therecent past and
near-term future see Sargen, Commercial Bank Lending to Developing
Countries, ECON. REV. (Spring 1976) esp. at 24-25:
Prior to the oil crises (1967-72) the external public debt of non-OPEC
developing countries ... grew at a steady rate of 14 percent per annum
* . . There was a noticeable acceleration in debt outstanding and debt
service in 1973 but this was offset by extraordinarily high commodity
prices . .. [hence] a decline in 'real' debt outstanding . .. [I]t is . . .
evident that [for 1974-75] there has been a marked acceleration in LDC
external debt in nominal terms [e.g.,...] over 20 percent... [R]eal debt
outstanding, [however, has accelerated at] an annual rate of about 11.5
percent in 1974-75, compared with 8 percent in 1967-73. This means...
that debt has grown much more slowly in real terms than in nominal
terms.
13. WORLD FINANCIAL MKTS., November 1977, at 4.
14. BRETTON WOODS AGREEMENT AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1977, REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE, on S. 2152, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. at 8 (1977) (hereinafter cited as the Witteveen Report).
15. Id. at 7.
16. A financial newsletter published by the Chase Manhattan Bank stated
in its February 1977 edition:
Although no precipitous drop in level of bank lending to LDCs as a
group can now be forecast for 1977, there is no question but that both the
rate of increase of bank credit to this group of countries and the levels of
net lending to particular countries are declining and will continue to
During the summer and fall of 1977 it became fashionable to
assert that the Witteveen Facility would somehow fill the void
that the self-modulation of lending activity by the private sector
would create. Yet, as testimony at the September, 1977 Senate
hearings on United States participation in the Facility made
clear, the Facility is not intended to replace private activity but
rather to promote it.
The intent [of the Facility] is to recreate the conditions favorable for
the continued lending of the private commercial banks to oil deficit
debtor countries [in the amount of at least $140 billion during 1978-80]
... [T]he private banks will have to continue lending at approximate-
ly the same level [as in 1974-76] if the continued large deficits of oil
importing countries are to be financed .... [T]he primary function of
this facility will be to bolster the confidence of the private capital
markets in the ability of deficit countries to repay .... This will then
enable the private banks to continue lending.'
7
Increased participation by the International Monetary Fund
("IMF") in further LDC loans appears to be the only circum-
stance under which the private banking community would be
prevailed upon to drop its announced reluctance to maintain
1974-1976 lending levels.18 This participation, as suggested by
various parties, assumes various theoretical forms.
For Undersecretary of State Richard Cooper, testifying be-
fore the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the Witteveen
hearings, it meant supplying a (by now infamous) "good house-
keeping seal of approval [for countries seeking loans], which
[would] encourage banks in terms of the viability of the policies
of the countries in question."'19 For a high official of the Bank of
Italy the "real role of the IMF was that of 'certifier of member
countries' credit worthiness. ' 20 For the Chairman of one of the
"big six"21 U.S. banks, which hold roughly 35% of LDC private
decline. The non-oil LDCs have utilized a substantial amount of the
unused borrowing capacity they possessed at the time of the OPEC
price increases of late 1973. and banks are subjecting new credit re-
quests to increasingly rigorous reviews. As a result, the ability of the
LDCs either to postpone adjustment to the direct and indirect conse-
quences of higher oil prices or to follow a strategy of gradual adjust-
ment is becoming increasingly limited.
INT'L FINANCE, Chase Manhattan Bank Economics Group, Feb. 21,1977, at 1;
see also WORLD FINANCIAL MKTS., (Morgan Guaranty Trust Company, January
1977), at 1.
17. Witteveen Report, supra note 14, at 19, 20.
18. An organization of central banks of participating countries for the
purpose of controlling the fluctuation of currencies in the world marketplace;
promotes international monetary cooperation and elimination of trade restric-
tions; assists the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(World Bank) in promoting economic development of Lesser Developed
Countries.
19. Witteveen Report, supra note 14, at 19.
20. The Real Role of the IMF, EUROMONEY, October 1977 at 141.
21. The "Big Six" U.S. banks are the Bank of America, Citibank, Chase
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debt,22 the IMF's function would be to pass on "information
directly germane to credit worthiness," to exercise its "unique
capability to encourage national monetary and economic
policies in constructive directions," and in general to "collabo-
rate" with the private sector through use of its "power of condi-
tionality. ' 23 In this latter view, "[b]y the use of parallel but sepa-
rate loan agreements co-ordinated through cross-default
clauses, both the IMF and the commercial banks would be pro-
tected by the 'conditionality' requirements of the IMF...,.
Interesting as these theories are, they seem to have little to do
with reality and certainly are peculiar grounds upon which to
base affirmative credit judgments.
In point of fact, the presence or absence of the IMF in a loan
situation can hardly change the basic fact that the LDC mega-
deficit already totals $180 billion, that "there is no foreseeable
end to the accumulating surplus of the oil producers. .. ,25, and
that there is little chance of even the current LDC mega-deficit
ever being repaid.2 6
The commercial bank/IMF cross-default provisions vaunted
by the "big six" spokesman do not materially improve the
chances of pay-back. At best, they merely insure that everyone
Manhattan Bank, Morgan Guaranty Trust Company, Manufacturers Hanover
Trust Company, and the Chemical Bank.
22. ECON. REV., supra note 9 at 22.
23. Houge, How the Banks Should Work With the Fund, EUROMONEY, 57
(Oct. 1977).
24. Id. at 60.
25. Witteveen Report, supra note 14 at 32.
26. See Davis, How Risky is International Lending, 1-2 HARv. Bus. REV.
135 (1977):
There is no doubt that international banks as a whole,. now have an
irrevocable commitment to the financial health of a variety of country
borrowers ... Wistful preferences for traditional corporate customers
and talk of 'squeezing out' sovereign risk borrowers ignore the reality of
the massive existing exposure of the banking community to a number of
major sovereign borrowers. These borrowers cannot possibly reduce,
much less pay off, their current level of foreign debt and will require
new lending for the foreseeable future just to meet maturing obliga-
tions.
and Still Lending to LDC's Despite High Risks, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 1, 1976, at 96:
The fact remains that the world's big banks-with the U.S. banks in the
lead-are owed $70 billion by the developing countries and the likeli-
hood of collecting on those loans-which looked so bright just a few
months ago-look a good deal less so today. The situation could ease if
the world economy suddenly revives. If it does not, then the danger of
major defaults or of a debt moratorium by the LDCs remains very real.
will be in the same bankruptcy court at the same time; at worst,
they are dangerous in that they enable one lender to exercise a
power to precipitate defaults out of all proportion to the size of
his loan. As was observed with respect to the cross-default
clauses in contemporary Zaire loan agreements;
The formal calling of default by even one of the ninety-odd commer-
cial banks would not necessarily have got them their money back, but
would certainly have had most serious consequences reaching far
beyond commercial bank lenders to Zaire's governmental and institu-
tional creditors.
27
Finally, there are severe limits on the real-world use that can
be made of "conditionality":
If the problem is shifted to the IMF, certain additional difficulties
arise from the nature of the restrictions the IMF will impose: The rate
of growth of the economy of the LDC is slowed; its imports are re-
duced; unemployment rises. In brief, an internal economic setback,
unacceptable politically to the ruling government in the LDC, is sug-
gested and, if the loan is taken, occurs.2 8
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee observed on the
same point,
The internal policy adjustments, the shift of resources from consump-
tion to investment, deflationary policies designed to reduce imports,
and possible reduction in social services, in effect, reducing living
standards, are likely to be politically hazardous to the countries which
attempt to implement them .... As the IMF negotiations with the
United Kingdom demonstrated, even advanced industrial democ-
racies confront agonizing political dilemmas in the course of such
negotiations.2 9
In sum, it may well prove impossible in terms of LDC domes-
tic politics to comply with IMF conditionality standards. The
consequence would be a reduced flow of private loans with
resultant severe LDC payments imbalances and domestic sup-
ply shortages. In this environment, an entire gamut of work-out
problems-foreign exchange blockage, interference with opera-
tions of foreign-affiliated projects, rescheduling of governmen-
tal obligations and default on government guarantees-is likely
to develop.
The Destabilized Monopoly
The need for what might otherwise appear an excessively
cautious approach to LDC investment is also grounded in the
premise that there exists ultimately, if not initially, a fundamen-
tal conflict of interest between LDC governments and capital-
exporting investors. This condition of dynamic antagonism,
27. Zaire Promises to Do Better, EUROMONEY, December 1976, at 114.
28. Awash in a Sea of Debt-Banks and LDCs, THE BANKERS MAGAZINE,
19-20 (Summer 1977).
29. Witteveen Report, supra note 14 at 17.,
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characteristic of the bilateral monopoly market structure,
would result whether an investment were of debt or of equity
and whether the recipient entity were a government or a private
project. Despite public pronouncements to the contrary by U.S.
business and governmental leaders, occasionally so relentlessly
optimistic as to appear ingenuous, 0 the foreign investment
record of the past decade has been one of accelerating goal
divergence as between host governments and foreign investors.
This acceleration has been manifested by the increased pace of
LDC intervention in private projects31 and is virtually certain to
be given new impetus by the decline in LDC credit-worthiness,
and the concomitant increase in the governmental default risk
which will accrue from the development of a mega-deficit
condition. 32 More serious than the mere fact of the existence of a
bilateral monopoly condition and its probable destabilization by
payments deficit pressures, is the fact that already the balance
of power within the monopoly has shifted noticeably away from
the investor. One of the first observers of foreign investment
affairs to analogize the LDC/foreign investor relationship to
that of the classical bilateral monopoly noted as early as 1968
that the position of the MNC competitor was gradually being
eroded:
[In foreign investment] the possibilities for misunderstanding are
enormous ... [A]ntagonism between host country and investing
company rests not only on different production functions and factor
proportions, and an unsavory historical record ... in addition, their
interests diverge. Both are interested in bigger pies, but for a pie of
any given size, more for one means less for the other . . . Most in-
stances of direct investment in less developed countries are akin to
bilateral monopoly, where the reserve prices of the two parties are far
apart ... [and in this] bilateral, non-zero-sum game represented by
direct investment in the less-developed country, there has been a
30. See, Multinational Investment and Global Purpose, address by Lee A.
Iacocca, President, Ford Motor Company, VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY, Vol.
XXXXII, No. 23, Sept. 15, 1977; but see The Challenges Facing the Multination-
al Corporation, address by Nolan B. Sommer, Vice-President, American Cy-
anamid Company, VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY, Vol. XLIV, no. 3, Nov. 15, 1977.
31. See Hawkins, Mintz and Provissiero, Governmental Takeovers of U.S.
Foreign Affiliates: A Postwar Profile, Occassional Paper No. 7, Center' for
Multinational Studies, Washington, D.C., Feb. 1975.
32. See, Still Lending to LDC's Despite High Risks, Bus. WEEK, Nov 1, 1976
at 86; Poorer Countries Face Test of their Ability to Repay Bank Loans, Wall
St. J., Apr. 14, 1977, at 1, ed. 6; Commercial Banks Ride Tiger in Developing
Countries, Christian Sci. Monitor, October 17, 1977, at B6, col. 1.
steady shift in the advantages from the side of the company to that of
the country. 3
One index of the extent to which LDC governments perceive
themselves as having attained a dominant position vis a vis the
MNC's is the extent to which they are willing to unilaterally
restructure the terms of interaction between countries. There
can be little doubt that as competition among MNC's has grown,
as technology in some industries has become more readily avail-
able, and as host governments have become more sophisticated
in economics and politics, such unilateral restructuring, most
often in the form of expropriation, has become a widespread
phenomenon. During the 1960-1974 period, no less than 875 dis-
crete instances of expropriation occurred involving 62 different
host countries. Far from abating after the initial spate of inter-
ventions consequent on the arrival on the international scene in
the late 1950's of the plethora of fledgling post-colonial govern-
ments, the pace of expropriation accelerated during the early
1970's. While the 1960-1969 timeframe showed an average of 45.5
expropriations per year for all regions, the 1970-1973 rate was
nearly double that, or 93.3 per year.3 4 Nor do these statistics
include the 1973 and 1974 petroleum industry expropriations
which may have -included relatively few discrete events but
whose effect in terms of value lost by foreign firms was
extreme.
The commercial risks of overseas investment have grown
equally precipitously. One study conducted by Chemical Bank
during 1974, indicated that of 17 mature projects surveyed, 14,
or 82%, had encountered some, form of significant financial
difficulty, ranging from cost overruns to marketing problems; 8,
or 47%, during some portion of the financing period failed to
generate sufficient cash flow to cover principal payments, de-
spite the fact that projected coverage of total debt service in-
cluding interest ranged from a low of 1.10 to a high of 4.77; 2, or,
12%, went bankrupt; and 6, or 35%, failed to generate the level of
cash flow originally projected.3 5
If this is the track record of the pre-mega-deficit years, the
years before LDC credit lines had been fully drawn down and
before raw material prices had escalated radically, the pros-
pects for the mega-deficit era can hardly be better. Some
commentators have gone so far as to conclude from the pre-
33. C. KINDLEBERGER, AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD, 147-150 (1969).
34. Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, Report of the Secre-
tary General, 28 U.N. ECOSOC, U.N. Doc. A/9716 annex at 6 (1974).
35. Castle, Project Financing-Guidelines for the Commercial Banker, THE
J. OF COM. BANK LENDING (Apr. 1975).
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mega-deficit record, utilizing a rationale that could be applied
as well to sovereign loan defaults, that because the intervention-
ist trend appears to be gaining rather than losing momentum,
and because the interventions, or defaults, as the case may be,
are perpetrated by sovereign governments rather than by pri-
vate sector entities, the position of the MNC's has deteriorated
to the point that there is little investors can legally do to protect
themselves and minimize investment loss exposure.
* * . [T]he numbers of takeovers are increasing. They may well
continue to increase for some years, as the new sophistication of host
country policy making, the modern wave of nationalism, and the
strength of competition among MNC's all combine to make expropria-
tion both feasible and politically desirable for host governments.
These same factors also make the trend competitively and legally
beyond the effective resistance of the MNC's themselves .... 36
It must, in sum, be acknowledged that the MNC position with-
in the bilateral structure has been eroded by growing LDC
sophistication and militancy; that conventional legal measures
have not prevented this erosion; and that the onset of the mega-
deficit era seems likely to exert even greater pressures on
LDC/MNC legal relationships.
THE PIVOTAL ROLE OF INVESTOR'S COUNSEL
The suggestion that investors are legally impotent in the face
of LDC militancy and the deterioration of the investment milieu
has much to recommend it. There are patent challenges posed
by these developments that are of a different order of mag-
nitude than those posed to investor and counsel by the familiar
inter-firm competitive model. Nonetheless, it would be incorrect
to conclude that the negotiation of substantive legal agreements
had been rendered futile or of strictly academic interest be-
cause of the propensity of sovereign borrowers, guarantors, co-
venturers and governments to violate agreements at will and the
probability that under mega-deficit conditions they would do so
with increasing frequency. Deteriorating investment condi-
tions, on the contrary, make the conclusion of secure legal ar-
rangements all the more important and counsel's role as risk
neutralizer all the more pivotal. "[Tihe investor has to be made
reasonably certain of the future. . . ; he must be made to be-
lieve that there is little or no possibility of the creation of an
36. Supra note 26, at 17.
unfavorable legal situation at a later date which will be detri-
mental to his investment. . ."
If counsel is to provide the investor with such "reasonable
certainty" he must recognize that as investment risks increase,
so increase both the pivotal importance of his role, and his
responsibility to anticipate work-out problems and devise deal-
structuring and documentation techniques which provide pro-
tection against them.
The Need for "Efficient" Documentation
One's initial reaction to the foregoing recital may well be,
"Right, exactly, and that's just why project and development
loan documents, joint venture agreements, and equity invest-
ment packages are already so voluminous. That's precisely why
investors get sponsor guaranties, completion agreements, cross-
default provisions, central bank guaranties, and host govern-
ment undertakings." However, this response hardly addresses
the conditions of financial stress, destablized bilateral monopo-
ly and work-out probability that exist today. The primary rea-
son for the inadequacy of the response is that it emphasizes the
quantity, or tonnage, of documentation, rather than its quality,
or efficiency. Reliance on the conventional paperwork of the
pre-mega-deficit era can prove seriously inadequate under cur-
rent and foreseeable conditions of oil-price financing stress,
exacerbated country against company antagonism, and in-
creased work-out frequency.
As early as 1959, one commentator observed that,
In the case of many of the underdeveloped countries today,. it is
impossible to predict with confidence that conditions of stability and
security will exist during the period of dynamic change ahead.
Thus arises the need for legal guarantees given [e.g.] by the state or
states concerned to the prospective foreign investors in order to as-
sure them that they will receive, in the future as well as today, certain
definite legal treatment, as specified in the guarantees. ...
[However, it must be concluded] that no guarantee can today pro-
vide complete security (even from non-business risks). The lack of
security of investments in foreign, and especially underdeveloped,
countries is due to, and is a manifestation of, the general lack of
stability in today's economic as well as political situation. It is not
possible to provide complete security for investment where the under-
lying economic and political conditions are unstable . . . . It is not
possible to state that any guarantee [is) certain to survive a radical
change in the guaranteeing country's general political, economic, and
social structure. Survival is possible but is by no means sure.
3 8
37. A. Fatouros, Legal Security for International Investments, LEGAL As-
PECTS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS, 699 (W. Friedman 1959).
38. Id. 700-732.
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Again, this judgment, in concluding that it is impossible to
provide for investment security by legal means, is too severe. It
does suggest, however, that a ritualistic reliance upon the "stan-
dard forms" of investment documentation and the conventional
methodology of legal risk reduction is inappropriate in the
context of high work-out probability.
That even the most carefully drafted host government
guaranty will be of little utility if not augmented by more sub-
stantive arrangements, is well illustrated by the case of the
expropriation of the Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company
("TOPCO") and California Asiatic Oil Company ("CALASIAT-
IC") petroleum concessions in 1973-1974 by the Libyan Arab
Republic ("LAR").
The concession agreements in question were originally
concluded between 1955 and 1968 and amended by mutual
agreement in 1963 and 1966. 3 9 Each deed was entered into pur-
suant to Libya's Petroleum Law of 1955, and was virtually a
verbatim copy of a model contract contained in that Law.
Clause 16 of the model contract explicitly provided that "the
Government of Libya, the [Petroleum] Commission and the ap-
propriate authorities will take all steps necessary to ensure that
the Company [TOPCO or CALASIATIC] enjoys all the rights
conferred by the Concession. The contractual rights expressly
created by this Concession shall not be altered except by the
mutual consent of the parties."4 °
An amendatory decree promulgated in 1961 reaffirmed the
government's commitment to the principals of due process and
pacta sunt servanda ("agreements are to be respected"), stating
that:
(1) The ... Government... and [all] competent authorities ... shall
take all steps that are necessary to ensure that the Company enjoys all
rights conferred on it by this concession, and the contractual rights
expressly provided for in this concession may not be infringed except
by agreement of both parties...
(2) This concession shall be interpreted during the period of its effec-
tiveness in accordance with the provisions of the Petroleum Law and
the Regulations issued thereunder at the time of the grant of the
39. Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company and California Asiatic Oil
Company v. The Government of the Libyan Arab Republic; International Arbit-
ration; Preliminary Award and Award on the Merits, Aug. 1977; in the author's
files.
40. Id. Preliminary Award, at 2.
concession, and any amendments to or cancellation of these Regula-
tions shall not apply to the contractual rights of the Company except
with its consent."
4 1
Similarly, a July 1963 amendment specifically provided that
nothing contained therein should adversely affect the contract
rights granted concessionaires under the 1955 Law.
42
Despite these assurances, by Decrees of Nationalization of
September 1, 1973, and February 11, 1974, first 51% and then the
remaining 49% of the ownership of the concessions was trans-
ferred to the "Arab Gulf Exploration Company," an entity 100%
owned by the LAR.43 The oil companies, exercising rights spe-
cifically granted in the concessions, submitted the matter to
international arbitration. Libya refused to name an arbitrator
and made no appearance in any of the procedural hearings,
save for the submission of a conclusory memorandum in July
1974 purporting to demonstrate that the expropriations were
acts of state and were therefore non-arbitrable. The companies,
as provided in the concessions, requested the President of the
International Court of Justice to appoint a sole arbitrator to
adjudicate the dispute.
The sole arbitrator was named in December 1974. On January
19, 1977, he rendered an award on the merits in favor of TOPCO
and CALASIATIC, granting their request for restitutio in in-
tegrum and allowing Libya until June 30, 1977, to comply with
the decision.44 As of that expiration date, compliance had not
been effected. As will be discussed below, had it not been for the
availability of legal remedies quite unrelated to the terms of the
concessions, it is highly unlikely that the Companies would have
received any compensation at all, much less restitutio in in-
tegrum.45
What is striking about the LAR/Texaco case in terms of the
adequacy of host government undertakings is, first, the clarity
with which the Libyan obligations were stated and, second, the
frequency with which they were reaffirmed and ratified. Yet
even under these relatively ideal conditions, the undertakings
were discarded when expediency so required.
Another illustration of LDC contra pacta behavior is pro-
vided by a recent case involving a construction contract entered
41. Id. at 3.
42. Id. at 4.
43. Id. at 6.
44. Id. Award on the Merits, at 90.
45. The term "restitutio in integrum" literally translated means "full
compensation;" however, for an analytical discussion of the phrase as it is
applied to international law, see id. at 76 and note 62, infra.
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into between an American company and the Government of
Afghanistan. There, the construction contract definitely, al-
though in imprecise language, mandated the submission of all
disputes to a panel of arbitrators upon the reasonable demand
of either party for such arbitration.4 6 A dispute arose at the
completion of the project over the payment by the Government
of roughly $2 million in cost overruns incurred by the contrac-
tor. Despite the arbitration provisions the government refused
even to discuss arbitration until it was all but forced to do so by
the contractor's invocation of remedies, including diplomatic
pressure, completely outside the four corners of the construc-
tion contract.
Juxtaposing, on the one hand, the probability that the onset of
mega-deficit conditions will aggravate the destabilization of the
LDC/MNC bilateral monopoly relationship, and, on the other,
the limited efficiency of conventional documentation under
work-out conditions, there appears to be a need to develop and
define a new legal methodology better adapted to the elements
of the changed LDC investment environment, subsuming both
the structuring and documentation aspects of a deal and stres-
sing the provision of adequate investment security.
The following sections, drawing primarily on investment ex-
periences in Central America and East Africa, discuss a num-
ber of steps that counsel can take to implement a "work-out
perspective" and develop such a problem-oriented methodol-
ogy.
Local Counsel
Provision of adequate security must begin with the selection
of local counsel of the highest caliber available in the particular
LDC jurisdiction. There is no need to dwell upon the mechanics
of selection, the methods of fee calculation, or the cross-cultural
46. The arbitration clause stated:
Arbitration-Should legal action become unavoidable, the parties to
this Contract agree to submit their disputes, before any court action, to
an arbitration committee, two members of which will be nominated by
the respective parties and a third one appointed by the first two. If an
agreement is not reached within thirty (30) days on this third member,
he will be appointed by the International Chamber of Commerce. The
expert members must not be directly interested in the disputed matter
or be shareholders, directors, counselors, or employees in the organiza-
tion of either of the parties. Each party shall pay for the eventual ex-
penses of his expert and the prorated expenses of the third member.
idiosyncrasies to which U.S. counsel may wish to show some
deference; these aspects of dealing with local counsel have been
discussed at length elsewhere.17 Indeed, the frequent discus-
sions of these relatively insubstantial aspects of the inter-rela-
tionship between U.S. and local counsel have to a large extent
diverted attention from issues of greater moment which should
have a far greater claim on U.S. counsel's attention.
As a starting point, in all inter-counsel relationships where the
local attorney is not operating in an essentially non-legal capac-
ity (e.g., where U.S. counsel is not, as perhaps is the case in
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and some other Gulf jurisdictions, lim-
ited to selecting from among a small pool of attorneys who are
valued primarily for their social and political contacts and acu-
men), local counsel should be closely monitored and rigorously
supervised by U.S. counsel. This supervisory effort should take
a number of forms. First, written, rather than verbal, opinions
should be obtained from local counsel on all matters of signifi-
cant legal concern. This requirement should be adopted not
because U.S. counsel or client intends to sue if incorrect opin-
ions are forwarded but rather because the combination of (i)
local counsel's, perhaps subliminal but nonetheless very real,
awareness that such suit could under some circumstances be
brought and (ii) his being required to set forth in writing and in
defensible form the rationale underlying his advice, will in all
probability result in the provision of a more accurate and close-
ly reasoned opinion than would have been the case had the
advice been given in verbal form only.
The foregoing may seem an obvious prescription; and yet the
tendency to accept relatively casual telephone or in-person,
over-lunch assurances appears widespread and it may often
have extreme consequences. In recent work-out litigation in
Kenya and Zambia, local firms in each jurisdiction verbally
assured visiting U.S. counsel that contemplated bankruptcy, or
"winding-up," actions, to be instituted under the respective local
descendants of the British Companies Act, would be straight
forward and relatively cut-and-dried exercises. In point of fact,
it eventuated that in Kenya there were available several de-
fenses to the action concerned, several issues of fact required to
be proved, and several issues of equity to which the court, in
view of the pertinent precedents, could accord substantial
weight. Because of local counsel's assurances that the case,
47. See, Wilson, International Business Transactions: A Primer for the
Selection of Assisting Foreign Counsel, 10 INT'L L. 325 (1976).
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which was quite complex both factually and as a matter of law,
would be disposed of in a virtually procedural fashion and
largely on the basis of judgments already obtained by the peti-
tioner/investor in the United States, U.S. counsel and client gave
far less attention to briefing and "horse shedding" local counsel
as to the facts, the U.S. law and the equity issues concerned than
they would have if they had been accurately apprised of the
complexity of proving the case in local court.
This lack of forewarning also deprived U.S. counsel of the
opportunity to analyze in detail the local statutes applicable to
the litigation. This situation resulted in the invocation by local
counsel of an element of the local winding-up statute which was
not only unnecessary to petitioner's case but which was actually
detrimental in that it allowed defendant to introduce issues
which called for determination on an ex aequo et bono basis
rather than for determination on the strictly factual issue of
solvency. Introduction of these issues was almost certainly
more favorable to defendant than to petitioner.
It would also have been appropriate for U.S. counsel to have
reviewed applicable local case law. Developed under the British
Companies Act, based primarily on United Kingdom [UK] and
East African litigation, and divergent from the norms of United
States bankruptcy practice in several significant respects, the
case law contained a number of elements with which U.S.
counsel should have become conversant. Among those diver-
gent elements were the magistrate's broad discretion to refrain
from ordering a winding-up despite clear evidence of insolven-
cy, the magistrate's discretion to rewrite the contract upon
which the action was based, and the difficulty of obtaining
prejudgment attachment orders. Each of these elements proved
to have an adverse impact upon petitioner's case. Had U.S.
counsel had an opportunity to review local winding-up practice
and to devise tactics to deal with the problems presented, the
litigation would probably have proceeded more expeditiously
and to a more favorable conclusion.
In Zambia, the fact that U.S. counsel had no opportunity to
independently verify local procedural requirements resulted in
the litigation's failing even to reach the hearing stage. Because
of Zambia counsel's failure to check the relevant Authentica-
tion of Documents statute, an affidavit basic to petitioner's case
was authenticated by the Zambia Embassy in Washington, D.C.,
rather than by the U.S. Embassy in Lusaka as the statute re-
quired. The affidavit was thus deemed inadmissible by the
court, and petitioner's case was thrown out with costs to defend-
ant.
Examples of this sort of local counsel inefficiency are unfor-
tunately not difficult to educe. In a recent work-out situation on
a project loan in Costa Rica, the corporate group of which the
debtor was a member filed jointly for voluntary receivership.
The U.S. investor held guaranties, executed by several solvent
subsidiaries, of debt owned by the parent, which itself was
clearly insolvent. Collateral was the plant and equipment of one
of the guarantor subsidiaries. Normal Costa Rican practice was
for affiliated corporations to file for receivership severally
rather than as a group, the apparent motivation for the adoption
of the joint format by the debtor group being to create a situa-
tion where certain unsecured creditors could utilize their voting
power in a combined creditors meeting to prevent the secured
creditors from foreclosing on their collateral. The investor suc-
cessfully prevented the adoption of the joint format, and the
question then arose as to whether the investor was entitled
under Costa Rican law, by virtue of the guaranties it held, to
vote in subsidiary creditor meetings. If it could, it intended to
allow the receivership to go forward since it would still be in a
position to prevent the unsecured creditors from adopting any
plan that would have barred secured creditors from foreclosing.
If it could not, it intended to oppose the receivership as to the
subsidiaries since it would be unable to prevent the unsecured
creditors from voting through a no-foreclosure rule.
After being verbally assured by local counsel that as a
guaranty holder with an insolvent primary obligor, the investor
would be entitled to vote in meetings of subsidiary creditors
without calling the guaranty, U.S. counsel traveled to Costa
Rica and requested a written opinion on the matter. After
lengthy discussions among U.S. and local counsel and after
local counsel at U.S. counsel's behest had researched the ques-
tion further, it was discovered that in fact, contingent creditors
were not entitled under Costa Rican law to vote in meetings of
the guarantor's creditors. The investor was thereupon required
to shift its legal attention from the structuring of optimum re-
ceivership arrangements to an effort to persuade the referee not
to grant the receivership until the investor had been able to
negotiate satisfactory understandings with the unsecured direct
creditors of the subsidiaries.
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A similar problem arose concerning a legal opinion forward-
ed by a U.S. lender's counsel to a U.S. borrower investing in
Costa Rica for execution by borrower's local counsel. The opin-
ion included a "standard" representation that the borrower had
taken all steps necessary to register the loan with the appropri-
ate host government agency so that problems of reconversion of
Costa Rican colones to dollars would be minimized. Borrower's
local counsel rote copied the opinion letter, executed it, and duly
returned it despite the fact that no registration procedure could
even be initiated until a dollar check had been forwarded to
Costa Rica and had been presented there to a commercial bank
for redeposit with the Banco Central. Fortunately this error was
caught when lender's U.S. counsel queried lender's local
counsel on precisely what steps the borrower had taken to effect
the alleged "registration." Had not this inquiry been made and
the error caught, it is not at all clear whether the proper post-
disbursement registration steps would ever have been taken.
The point of these illustrations is not that local counsel are
incompetent and that U.S. counsel are omniscient; the point is
simply that, as the cliche rightly has it, a chain is only as strong
as its weakest link. As has been correctly observed, "[tihe courts
in many developing countries are not ideal places for the
foreign investor to press claims arising from his carefully word-
ed agreements. If the local courts are the final resort, they are
usually not particularly friendly toward the foreign inves-
tor. .. ,.48 There is little logic in a U.S. investor's retaining
skilled U.S. counsel; in U.S. counsel's becoming intimately
familiar with the documentation, the factual context, and the
applicable U.S. law; and then having both the investor and his
U.S. counsel go to bat in a foreign court where opponents may
be local creditors or indeed the government itself, with local
counsel who is insufficiently familiar with applicable U.S. law,
the facts and even the law of his own jurisdiction, and without
basic advice from local counsel on the aspects of local law that
need to be scrutinized. Representation which might be tolerable
in a $5,000 tort action should clearly be unacceptable in a mul-
timillion dollar investment work-out situation. The bottom line
is simply that U.S. counsel must be totally familiar with local
48. Wells, Negotiating with Third World Governments, 1-2 HARV. Bus. REV.
72-77 (1977).
law and that local counsel must be equally knowledgeable with
respect to the facts of the case, the applicable U.S. law, and the
law of his own jurisdiction.
Two additional features to be aware of in dealing with local
counsel are the need for the "legal work-horse" of local
counsel's firm to speak English (presupposing U.S. counsel does
not speak the host country language), and the need for the local
firm itself to be well regarded in the jurisdiction.
At the inception of a recent financing involving a project in El
Salvador, it was necessary for U.S. counsel to choose a firm in
the host country to act as local counsel. During the course of a
meeting with the senior partner of one candidate firm which
had been well recommended by two U.S. MNC's, it became clear
that the partner was indeed alert, accommodating, and political-
ly well-connected. These qualities would have been ample rec-
ommendation had the legal task been simply the establishment
of a Salvadorian corporation, the procurement of a government
license, the negotiation of a zonafranca lease, or any other as-
signment not involving the probability of work-out. Yet in the
context of a project investment, or indeed of any long-term
arrangement subject to substantial financial uncertainties, the
partner and his firm would have been a poor choice as local
counsel to a foreign investor represented by non-Spanish speak-
ing U.S. counsel. The reason was that the partner had never,
even in his early years in practice, undertaken the "shirt sleeve"
research work in his firm. His primary function, as appears to
be the case with senior partners in many LDC firms, had always
been to consult with government officials, other counsel, and
clients, but never to become intimately familiar with the
nuances and intricacies of local law. The "shirt sleeve" work, on
the other hand, had been relegated to a younger associate who,
as a subsequent meeting demonstrated, had an excellent knowl-
edge of local law but whose English was ungrammatical and
imprecise. Such a division of labor might have been acceptable
either where all parties used a common language or where the
prospective investment was virtually certain to be trouble-free.
In situations where work-out problems can reasonably be ex-
pected to arise, however, and where it will in all probability,
become necessary to discuss and evaluate not merely the alter-
native first responses to adverse developments, but the full
range of consequences following from each of those responses
and the end-result of each such "decision tree" branch, it is
critical that at least one member of the local firm possess both
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English language ability and an in-depth knowledge of local
law.
Similarly, the "appearance" of law firm suitability must never
be allowed to substitute for the actual acceptability of the firm
before the local bench. In some LDC jurisdictions the "best
known" firms, and indeed perhaps the best for routine drafting,
licensing or tax work, may be staffed largely with Europeans
remaining from colonial days. While they may serve well as
solicitors, they may be relatively ineffective as barristers. An
example of this problem was encountered in a particular Afri-
can jurisdiction where European local counsel, after being chas-
tised with undue severity by the presiding judge for a relatively
trivial technical defect in a pleading, readily admitted that in his
view, the magistrate's attitude could only be explained by cross-
cultural animosities. Within a week U.S. counsel had retained
more compatible local counsel to act as barrister and the case
preceeded noticeably more smoothly.
With the possibility of this sort of difficulty in mind, U.S.
counsel in the event of work-out litigation, should position him-
self to retain at least for court-room functions and preferably
for the overall conduct of the case, local counsel who are fully in
the mainstream of national culture and who will interact well
with the local bench.
A corollary to the foregoing rules is that logistics should never
be permitted to determine the outcome of a case. At times one
hears commentary by U.S. counsel to the effect that "Well, if we
were handling this one in New York (or, e.g., Houston or
Chicago) it would be a cinch, but having it in Kabul makes
things a lot harder." The fact that that observation contains a
grain of literal truth should never be used by counsel as justifi-
cation for fatalistically allowing logistical problems to go unre-
medied. Rather, at the first indication that the distance between
respective counsels' offices is significantly hindering document
delivery, or more seriously, inter-counsel consultation on litiga-
tion strategy, local statute and case law implications, or
negotiating tactics, U.S. counsel should take vigorous steps to
overcome the problems encountered and establish communica-
tions mechanisms that will insure that consultations can be held
readily and in sufficient detail to assure efficient handling of the
case.
Obviously, reliable telephone links are desirable. Telex link-
age is not only desirable but an absolute sine qua non. English
speaking operators and secretaries are also important. Ade-
quate in-country translation facilities should be available, and
available immediately, if need be, particularly in civil law
countries utilizing the notarial system, where a notary may re-
fuse to attest to the truthfulness of an imprecise translation,
necessitating revisions which may be even more costly in terms
of missed tactical opportunities than they are in terms of abso-
lute expense. Travel to the project country for frequent consul-
tations in the pre-litigation phase of a work-out, and the pres-
ence of U.S. counsel in-country during the litigation itself is
advisable and almost always cost-justifiable.
Having put the requisite document delivery, witness produc-
tion, and legal consultation mechnisms in place early on, U.S.
counsel should not hesitate to make full use of them. Extensive
telephone and telex traffic between U.S. and local counsel,
while at times involving some redundant discussion, will in most
instances serve a number of purposes besides the obvious one of
effecting the exchange of information between counsels. The
secondary and tertiary effects of frequent, and even redundant,
communication will include demonstrating to local counsel the
importance U.S. counsel attaches to the case, keeping local
counsel's attention focused on U.S. counsel's case rather than
allowing it to drift to other matters, and obliging local counsel to
provide consistent, well-reasoned and defensible advice,
rationale, and case law on a particular point in a number of
successive communications. In an ideal world, it would not be
necessary to rely on communications traffic to induce these
effects; they would result automatically from local counsel's
concern with carrying out his assignment conscientiously. In
the real world however, it cannot be assured that a foreign
investor's case will receive appropriate attention without a "spe-
cial effort" from U.S. counsel. Given that local counsel's full
attention is a basic component of any successful work-out cam-
paign, U.S. counsel should utilize the communications facilities
at his disposal to insure that his client does in fact get the
overseas legal services that he is paying for.
Local Statutes and Regulations
The need to provide effectively against the difficulties that
may be anticipated in work-out situations imposes on U.S.
counsel the responsibility to scrutinize certain provisions of lo-
cal law which do not ordinarily receive substantial attention
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when counsel, focusing primarily on structuring and docu-
menting the deal to provide the best yield, the most manage-
ment control, the largest concession area, etc., does not consider
security in a work-out context the primary concern. Additional-
ly, review of these statute areas entails the obligation to draft
investment documentation in such a way that the pitfalls and
opportunities that counsel finds in the statutes are effectively
neutralized or exploited, as the case may be.
A salient area of legal concern has traditionally been the host
country's investment code. Emphasis is commonly laid on
scrupulous compliance with the "investment purpose" and
"ownership" conditions the code sets out for customs exemp-
tions, tax holidays, and in some cases, such as Saudi Arabia, low
interest loans. In many instances the details of the documenta-
tion required under statutes other than the investment code to
evidence the fact that the investment has in fact been made in
approved form may be less carefully considered.
Virtually all jurisdictions with nonconvertible currencies, and
even many with ostensibly convertible currencies, (e.g., the West
African CFA franc zone), require the registration of incoming
capital as a condition of allowing the reconversion of local cur-
rency project proceeds to repatriable hard currency.49 This ap-
pears to be a straightforward requirement and one not likely to
be infringed. And yet difficulties may arise where the invest-
ment may flow to a number of jurisdictions or to a number of
recipients in a single jurisdiction.
In the case of a recent textile project investment, financing
was extended to a Panamanian holding company doing busi-
ness through subsidiaries located in Costa Rica. The loan was to
be disbursed to the parent in Costa Rica and was ostensibly to
be used to pay down bank overdrafts incurred by a subsidiary
for the importation of project related machinery. When U.S.
counsel required that the parent comply with the terms of the
loan agreement and register the loan with the Costa Rican Ban-
49. The CFA franc is issued by the African Financial Community
(Communaute Financiere Africiane) a financial grouping of seven West African
countries associated with France. As of December 1971, one U.S. Dollar equaled
255.785 CFA francs. The CFA franc is not pegged to gold; the French Govern-
ment guaranties to convert within the franc zone at the rate of one French franc
equal to 60 CFA francs. AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, AREA HANDBOOK FOR IVORY
COAST, p. xiii (2d ed. 1973).
co Central, the parent resisted on the grounds that the overdraft
paydowns had, in violation of the loan agreement, already been
made and had been paid in dollars to the U.S. headquarters of
the creditor banks. The parent had adopted this course of action
in order to avoid the transaction costs involved in converting
dollars to Costa Rican colones in order to effect registration and
then reconverting colones to dollars to pay down the overdrafts.
In order to obtain Banco Certral registration under these cir-
cumstances, the borrower had to reacquire dollars in the full
amount of the loan and have them converted to colones. Despite
the lender's insistence that this be done, the borrower continued
to delay performance because, as ultimately became apparent,
its financial condition had, even in the few months since dis-
bursement, deteriorated to the point where it would have had to
pay a high rate of interest in order to borrow the funds needed
to effect the registration.
Finally, after protracted correspondence and delay the parent
took out short-term colones loans, bought dollars, registered the
loan, received colones for the registered dollars, and paid off
the short-term loans. To avoid this sort of registration problem
and to maximize the chances of trouble-free repatriation, the
investor should be thoroughly familiar with host country invest-
ment registration laws, and tailor the investment agreement
provisions prescribing the borrower's registration obligations
and setting out the timing and manner of disbursement to the
requirements of those regulations.
A more serious registration problem arose in connection with
an African investment involving a loan to a Delaware parent for
flow-through to a Liberian operating subsidiary. The invest-
ment was properly registered in Liberia, but the loan agreement
failed to effectively require that additional registrations be ef-
fected when the loan proceeds were disseminated by the sub-
sidiary to its branch offices in other East and West African
countries. As a result, in order to obtain exchange control ap-
proval for remission of earnings and capital from the branch
jurisdictions, it became necessary to demonstrate de novo to the
local exchange control authorities that the amounts sought to be
remitted had in fact been imported as foreign exchange.
Under conditions of efficient management and lender/bor-
rower cordiality, that sort of demonstration would probably not
be inordinately difficult to effect. On the other hand, in work-
out circumstances such as those involved in the Liberian invest-
ment, financial records may be inadequate or even nonexistent,
the borrower may have no interest in facilitating repatriation,
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and it may even seek to induce the host government to refuse
permission for conversion of local to hard currency. In anticipa-
tion of such circumstances it is essential that investor's U.S.
counsel make every effort to insure that incoming investments,
whether in cash or in kind, are properly valued and registered in
every jurisdiction into which they flow. It is an elementary task
to draft into an investment agreement a covenant requiring
such registration, but a substantially more difficult task to
monitor and enforce the covenant. If enforcement is to be effec-
tive the investment agreement should both require the inves-
tor's prior consent to any cross-border asset transfers, and pro-
vide for spot-checks by investor-approved auditors as to the
disposition of obligor assets at any given time.
A second traditional concern in the area of host country law is
that of foreign exchange regulation. As with investment code
compliance, there are some aspects of exchange control regula-
tion that typically do not appear, from the literature and from
personal experience, to receive substantial attention but which
in a work-out context can cause serious problems for the
foreign investor.
The virtually inevitable concomitant of a work-out situation is
the necessity that recipient-to-investor repayments be effected
in a manner other than that prescribed by the original invest-
ment agreement. In many jurisdictions the foreign exchange
statute provides that a non-resident may not exercise control
over local currency without specific exchange control authori-
zation to do so. The applicable Kenya statute, for example,
provides that,
Except with the permission of the Minister, no person shall do any of
the following things in Kenya, that is to say-
(a) make any payment to or for the credit of a person resident
outside the scheduled territories; or
(b) make any payment to or for the credit of a person resident in
the scheduled territories by order or on behalf of a person
resident outside the scheduled territories; or
(c) place any sum to the credit of any person resident outside the
scheduled territories.
50
The Kenya Regulations further provide that
* . . In any proceeding in a prescribed court and in any arbitration
50. Laws of Kenya, Cap. 113, The Exchange Control Ordinance, Section 7.
proceeding, a claim for the recovery of any debt, shall not be defeated
by reason only of the debt not being payable without the permission of
the Minister and of that permission not having been given or having
been revoked.51
The Zambia statute, also modeled on antecedent British stat-
utes, is substantially similar.5 2
Despite the availability of this provision in the Kenya Ordi-
nance, a creditor of a Kenya borrower, if he has not obtained the
requisite exchange authorization prior to commencing suit for
repayment of funds owed, would be well advised either to plead
his specific intention to obtain such authorization before taking
control of the funds in question or, if the creditor has already
gained de facto control of certain debtor assets and is seeking
de jure sanction for that control, initiate attempts to avail him-
self of the retroactive approval provisions included at Section
20(2) of the Kenya Ordinance.5 3
Neither of the above courses of action is inordinately difficult
or risky, although it is far from certain that retroactive approval
can be successfully requested in all circumstances. The inves-
tor's primary problem, however, and the reason in particular
that he might seek retroactive approval, is that prior to receipt
of the authorization to hold the sums in dispute, he is at a
disadvantage in any attempt to prevent the funds from falling
into the hands of the debtor or of any other creditor who is
either a resident or, if a non-resident, holds exchange approval.
Once control of the funds passes from the investor's or neutral
control, they may be dissipated before, and even if, the investor
ultimately prevails.
51. Laws of Kenya, Cap. 113, The Exchange Control Ordinance, Fourth
Schedule, Section 4(1).
52. Laws of Zambia, Cap. 593, Exchange Control, Subsidiary Legislation,
Section 3, Part III, paragraph 8, Payments in Zambia:
Except with the permission of the Minister, no person shall-
(a) make any payment to or for the credit of a person resident outside
Zambia; or
(b) make any payment to or for the credit of a person resident in
Zambia by order or on behalf of a person resident outside Zam-
bia; or(c) place any sum to the credit of any person resident outside Zam-
bia;...
The provision with respect to repayment of debts is found at, Laws of Zambia,
Cap. 593, Exchange Control, Subsidiary Legislation, Section 3, Part VII, para-
graph 36, Legal Proceedings, etc.
53. Section 20(2) provides: (2) Without prejudice to subsection (1) of this
section, the Minister may issue a certificate declaring, in relation to a security,
that any acts done before the issue of the certificate purporting to effect the
issue or transfer of the security, being acts which were prohibited by this Act,
are to be, and are always to have been, as valid as if they had been done with the
permission of the competent authority, and the said acts shall have effect ac-
cordingly.
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A second foreign exchange problem little recognized but like-
ly to arise under work-out conditions concerns the definition of
the status of funds segregated by the resident debtor for benefit
of the non-resident investor. Again using Kenya as an example,
the relevant statutes are Exchange Control Ordinance Section
7, quoted above and, Section 8, which states:
(1) Except with the permission of the Minister, no person in Kenya
shall, subject to the provisions of this section, make any payment
outside Kenya to or for the credit of a person resident outside the
scheduled territories, and no person resident in the scheduled ter-
ritories shall in Kenya do any act which involves, is in association with
or is preparatory to the making of any such payment.
Section 7 brings into question the legality of any unapproved
segregation of funds for repayment of investment debts where
the non-resident investor is able to exercise any meaningful
form of control over the segregated account. Such control could
be deemed to be present if the account were in the investor's
name; if an investor signature were required, even on a joint
basis, for withdrawals; if the account were subject to letters of
instruction, whether or not revokable, from the debtor inform-
ing the depository bank that the account were only to be
operated with investor concurrence; or, conceivably, if ex-
ecuted copies of the debtor/investor agreement pursuant to
which the account had been opened were delivered to the de-
pository institution and an assertion later made by the investor
that such delivery had rendered the bank a de facto fiduciary,
which could not disburse the funds to the account party without
approval from the investor.
Section 8, in turn, can be interpreted to bar repayments from
"offshore" collateral accounts established by the Kenya branch,
or from other branches in respect of monies owed by the Kenya
branch.
Under conditions of investor/debtor cooperation, application
for and procurement of the requisite exchange approvals would
ordinarly not be difficult, assuming that the debtor had main-
tained adequate records of capital imports. Under work-out
conditions, however, the borrower may well seek to obstruct
repayment. Records can be "lost" and approval applications
deferred. Indeed, the very elements of account control essential
to the investor's security may be alleged by the debtor, rival
creditors, or the local foreign exchange authority to constitute
violations of provisions such as Sections 7 and 8, above. With
these unpleasant possibilities in view, counsel should thor-
oughly research local exchange control regulations, obtain a
written opinion from local counsel confirming that proposed
repayment arrangements are not violative of those regulations,
and obtain the same representation from the recipient, supple-
mented by a statement that it acknowledges its obligations to
make all payments and transfers of whatever nature in
compliance with local exchange regulations and to comply with
local law, generally.
Another area of host country law that may not be adequately
examined during the conventional negotiating and drafting
stages of investment structuring but which becomes all-im-
portant in a work-out context is that of host country bankruptcy
law. In some respects, foreign bankruptcy systems may vary
from the U.S. system to the investor's advantage, and in other
respects to his disadvantage. A relatively favorable feature is
that in most Companies Act jurisdictions, 4 such as Zambia, a
creditor petitioning for involuntary winding-up does not have to
allege and prove that the debtor has committed an "act of bank-
ruptcy." The pleadings will be sufficient if they demonstrate
that the debtor is insolvent and unable to pay its debts.
An unfavorable feature would be that in civil law juris-
dictions, such as Costa Rica, officers and directors of a firm
may be subject to personal liability if they have knowledge that
the firm is insolvent but nevertheless allow it to continue in
business. This contingent liability can motivate debtor manage-
ment to file for receivership on the basis of considerations of
personal welfare rather than on the basis of what is best for the
firm. This, in turn, is likely to result in "surprise" filings effected
before the investor has been fully apprised of, and had an op-
portunity to respond to, the firm's financial deterioration.
Pledges of debtor stock may prove of little value in preventing
disadvantageous voluntary filing by the debtor if host country
corporation law, while recognizing the validity of pledges in
general, imposes time-consuming restraints on the manner in
54. A reference to a country which has come under the influence of the
British common law, is currently-or was-a member of the British Common-
wealth that has adopted a Companies Act to license, govern and regulate a
business enterprise (and its conduct) within its jurisdiction.
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which stockholder voting power can be used once the pledge is
foreclosed. Under Liberian law, for example, voting for direc-
tors occurs at an annual meeting, 5 and special meetings can
only be called by specified corporate officers. 56 In the face of
hostile management, therefore, foreclosing pledgees could be
prevented from gaining effective control of the debtor until it
had been subjected by management to the jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy court. The need to review the interrelationship of
local bankruptcy and corporation law provisions with this sort
of work-out difficulty in mind is clear.
A final area of host country law which assumes particular
importance in the work-out context is that covering the recogni-
tion and enforcement of foreign judgments. Companies Act
jurisdictions typically have a series of statutes in force prescrib-
ing differing recognition criteria for judgments originating in
different groups of forum states. Uganda, for example, has one
recognition statute which is applicable only to judgments ren-
dered by the courts of Tanzania, Kenya and Malawi. This stat-
ute recognizes virtually no defenses and, for enforcement pur-
poses, places properly endorsed judgments of the three named
jurisdictions on the same basis as a Uganda judgment.5 7
A second Uganda recognition statute applies to judgments
originating in the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland, and any
Commonwealth nation that has signed a reciprocal recognition
treaty with the United Kingdom. Recognition may be granted if
the Court deems it "just and convenient" and if none of six
enumerated criteria are violated.58
Finally, a third statute prescribes rules applicable to the re-
cognition of judgments of all forum states not named in the first
two statutes. The provisions with respect to defenses to recogni-
tion specify, in pertinent part:
On an application in that behalf duly made by any party against
whom a registered judgment may be enforced, the registration of the
judgment-
(a) shall be set aside if the registering court is satisfied-
55. Liberian Code of Laws of 1965, Tit. 4 (Associations Law), ch. I (Corpora-
tions), § 27.
56. Id. § 21.
57. Laws of Uganda, Cap. 46, The Judgments Extension Act.
58. Id. Cap. 47, The Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, §§ 3(1) and
3(2)(a)-(f).
(i) that the judgment is not a judgment to which this part of this
Act applies or was registered in contravention of the forego-
ing provisions of this Act; or
(ii) that the courts of the country of the original court had no
jurisdiction in the circumstances of the case; or
(iii) that the judgment debtor, being the defendant in the pro-
ceedings in the original court, did not (notwithstanding that
process may have been duly served on him in accordance
with the law of the country of the original court) receive
notice of those proceedings in sufficient time to enable him
to defend the proceedings and did not appear; or
(iv) that the judgment was obtained by fraud; or
(v) that the enforcement of the judgment would be contrary to
public policy in the country of the registering court; or
(vi) that the rights under the judgment are not vested in the
person by whom the application for registration was made
59
The availability of a variety of statutes with variegated recog-
nition options and differing arrays of possible defenses makes it
incumbent upon counsel to structure the investment so that the
investor will be able to take maximum advantage of the enforce-
ment opportunities provided by the statutes, with minimum
exposure to the risk of having the judgment refused recognition
because of the successful invocation by the opposition of one of
the specified defenses.
Broadly speaking, this structuring effort resolves itself into
the identification of probable asset fora and the determination
of how to obtain judgments in those fora, whether by de novo
suit or by suit for recognition of a judgment imported from
another jurisdiction.
The specific determinations that should be made at the outset
of the structuring process include (i) identification of present
and probable future locations of obligor assets; (ii) comparison
of the favorability of recognition law and de novo suit law in
such asset jurisdictions; (iii) determination, in asset juris-
dictions where actions for recognition rather than actions de
novo will be relied upon, of which de novo jurisdictions receive
most favorable recognition treatment for their judgments; (iv)
determination of which, among such de novo jurisdictions,
would be the best situs for suit to be laid; and v) evaluation of
how to meet the requirements of that most favorable de novo
forum to insure that it will have jurisdiction over the issue
which is likely to be litigated.
60
59. Id. Cap. 48, The Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act.
60. Specifically dealing with item (v), for example, if the issue were the
violation by a sovereign of its guaranty to make foreign exchange available, it
would be necessary to determine whether the sovereign's waiver of the defense
of lack of jurisdiction as to the asset forum was sufficient to establish juris-
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With these determinations in hand, counsel can proceed with
the structuring process, keeping in mind the specifics of his
particular investment and certain general considerations as to
what constitutes advantageous structuring for recognition pur-
poses.
Imported judgments will be preferable where the law of the
asset jurisdiction is more favorable to the investor in the recog-
nition area than it is in the area of de novo suit (e.g., on the debt
or in contract). In the case of Uganda as an asset jurisdiction,
for example, its most favorable recognition statute, the provi-
sion relating to Kenya, Tanzania, and Malawi, is virtually de-
fense-free. If counsel believed that an investor could do better
suing on his debt in Malawi than in Uganda he might well
decide, even if the investment would otherwise have involved
only Uganda, to structure the deal so that Malawi was made a
viable suit forum. An adequate legal relationship, such as
branch-branch, borrower-guarantor, or subsidiary-parent,
would, of course, have to exist between the respective entities in
the asset and de novo suit jurisdictions in order for such struc-
turing to be effective.
The investor is afforded greater work-out security if at least
one asset jurisdiction is located outside the project country.
Whether or not an asset jurisdiction other than the project
country will in fact be available will turn on the specific struc-
turing of each individual investment.
A non-project-country asset jurisdiction would be available if
the structuring included an obligor which held assets outside
the project country, and there were sufficient grounds to estab-
lish that that asset forum had jurisdiction over an attachment
action brought by the investor and arising out of the investment
agreement. These requirements would generally be fulfilled
where the obligor was a legal resident of the asset forum, or had
diction or whether additional provisions would have to be made, such as, e.g.,
specifying that payment on the guaranty were to be made in the asset juris-
diction.
Moreover, with respect to the effect of place of payment on determination of
proper situs of an action, see, e.g., J. Zeevi and Sons v. Grindlays Bank (Ugan-
da) Limited, 37 N.Y. 2d 220, 226, 371 N.Y.S. 2d 892, 897 (1975).
[.. T]he facts establish a cause of action accruing within New York...
[D]efendant contracted to pay ... and [the letter of credit] took effect
i. . n New York ... In this instance New York was the locus of repudi-
ation...
specifically submitted to its jurisdiction. Where the obligor was
the project operator, it would probably be a legal resident of the
project forum, and thus specific submission to the jurisdiction
of the asset forum would be required.
A non-project-country asset forum might not, on the other
hand, be available if the parent of the investment recipient were
a holding company and had substantial liens against its non-
project-country assets, or if the investor had secured his invest-
ment through mortgages on the operating entity's project
country assets.
Whatever the final arrangements reflected in the investment
documentation, it is clear that the scrutiny of recognition stat-
utes and the analysis of de novo suit and asset jurisdictions are
steps that should be taken by counsel early in the structuring
process.
Increasing Documentation Efficiency
After selection of competent local counsel and close analysis
of local law, a third phase of the implementation of a "work-out
perspective" would be the improvement of the efficiency of
investment documentation. This effort consists, in essence, of
anticipating the particular work-out difficulties that may be
encountered in a given investment and drafting contractual
provisions in specific response to them.
Where, for example, the adversary party is a sovereign entity,
the investor would be well advised to conduct drafting negotia-
tions in such a way that if work-out problems did ultimately
eventuate, he would be able to demonstrate that the documenta-
tion with respect to which the dispute had arisen had been
freely negotiated and had not been imposed through overween-
ing bargaining power. It is prudent, in this regard, to obtain the
following representations from sovereign borrowers, guaran-
tors, co-venturers and governments as an integral part of the
investment documentation:
(1) that all previously executed agreements, undertakings and
contracts of whatsoever nature are reaffirmed;
(2) that the individuals executing the agreement on behalf of the
government are empowered to do so;
(3) that under the constitution and statutes of the country, no other
act of any branch or department, and no ratification, is necessary to
make the agreement binding on the country under its municipal law
and enforceable in its courts;
(4) that the government has itself reviewed, or has caused indepen-
dent consultants to review, project structure, loan terms, guaranty
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provisions, management agreements, etc., and is satisfied that the
terms thereof are fair and equitable as to it;
(5) that it has caused counsel to examine all pertinent documenta-
tion and that it understands and agrees with all terms, conditions and
provisions thereof; and
(6) that in the event of any nationalization, expropriation, or other
taking of, or interference with, the property or rights of the investor,
compensation shall be paid in accordance with international law and
calculated on the basis of the greater of fair market value, based on
capitalization of earnings, over a specific period, or net book value."'
Where the borrower is a private entity a different set of
concerns is present. The emphasis with a private borrower or
co-venturer must be on the monitoring of corporate financial
operations and the prevention of the dissipation of corporate
assets. A number of steps can be taken to achieve these objec-
tives.
The investment agreement should forbid the use of bearer
shares and allow the use of nominatives only. In most juris-
dictions where bearer shares are recognized, for example in
Liberia and Costa Rica, they are widely regarded as devices
employed primarily to facilitate tax evasion. Their reputation in
Costa Rica is such that where they are employed a 10% net
capital tax is imposed, whereas no such tax is imposed if
nominative shares are utilized. For the lender or foreign equity
participant, the presence of bearer shares entails the literal
impossibility of knowing from one day to the next who the real
owners of an entity are. Thus, bearer shares should be avoided
at all costs.
The investment agreement should further provide that ap-
praisals will be required for all collateral and that they are to
state that they have taken into specific account the original or
acquisition cost to the obligor of the property being appraised.
The inclusion of the acquisition cost figure provides within the
agreement a reference point which may be of value to the par-
ties for whose benefit the appraisal is prepared in determining
the reasonableness of its conclusions. The utility of such a refer-
ence figure was illustrated by a recent project loan case in Haiti.
There the borrower was to provide as collateral three parcels of
land which he had stated were worth a total of $250,000. An
61. Representations of this type were made by Zaire, with the apparent
approval of its U.S. counsel, in connection with the project referred to infra p.
348.
appraisal ordered by the lender and conducted by a local firm
placed the value at just under $90,000, but more significantly,
disclosed the fact that the recorded deeds to the borrower re-
cited purchase prices, none paid more than four years earlier,
totaling only $12,000. Lender's counsel opined that the true
value of the tracts, including appreciation, was probably close
to $50,000. Needless to say, additional collateral was promptly
requested. The lesson is that while very few lenders would ac-
cept a borrower's unsubstantiated asset valuation, all too many
will accept uncritically virtually any "independent" appraisal.
"Independent" should never be assumed to mean "accurate";
appraisals should always be double-checked. Similarly, the fact
that before on-shipment to the project, certain collateral has
appraised out at something resembling adequate value does not
necessarily mean that the collateral will arrive at the project site
or, if it does arrive, that it will remain there. If the collateral is
equipment, whether new or used, the investor should verify its
condition at the time of on-site delivery and the fact that all the
components of the collateral that were supposed to be delivered
on-site have, in fact, arrived. Periodic spot checks to verify the
location and quantity, of the equipment and inventory collateral
are also advisable. If the collateral includes land and buildings,
a title report, legal-description check by local counsel, or inde-
pendent survey should be utilized to confirm that the land par-
cel intended to be mortgaged has in fact been validly secured on
a first-lien basis, and that the buildings are in fact sited within
the boundaries of the secured parcel. Where there is resistance
by the investment recipient to provide collateral because of the
cost of mortgage taxes or financing agreement filing and notari-
zation fees, and if the lender is unwilling to make the collateral
request on a "take'it or leave it" basis, the cost of the fees in
question can be added to the loan amount. Borrower reluctance
to pay fees should never be the determinative factor in whether
or not to require collateral.
Negative covenants are no substitute for adequate collateral,
in that they can be violated with relative ease and impunity. In
general, the lender has no recourse against other creditors for
interference with the lender's contractual rights even if there is
public notice of the existence of the covenants. Actions against
the borrower for violation of the covenants are likely to be
superfluous in a work-out context where the loan agreement
has probably already been breached as to payment of principal
and interest. To provide effective insurance against violation of
negative covenants it is important to specify in the investment
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agreement that a condition precedent to disbursement is the
amendment of the corporate charter of the obligor or guarantor
to (i) deprive any officer, director or shareholder of the authori-
ty to conclude any agreement violative of the covenants and (ii)
provide that the charter section so limiting corporate authority
may not be rescinded or amended without the prior written
consent of the investor. This approach should lend substantial
color to the investor's argument, should the negative covenants
be violated, that the creditors in violation hold invalid and unau-
thorized obligations and that they had, because of the charter,
ample notice that any violations of the negative covenants
would be ultra vires.
Financial monitoring is an area which usually receives sub-
stantial emphasis in conventional loan and co-venturing docu-
ments but not always in an efficient fashion. The typical
"unaudited-quarterlies-and-audited-annuals" formula is not
adequate in circumstances where a work-out can reasonably be
anticipated. In the case of an investment involving a new ven-
ture or start-up, the submission of end-of-month work sheets for
the first 12 to 18 months is an entirely appropriate requirement.
It is not enough to specify in investment documents that ac-
counts and records should be maintained on a current basis and
in accordance with U.S. accounting principles; the investor
should have a means of verifying that the requirements are
being observed and have an effective sanction which may be
invoked if they are not. Quarterlies should be personally cer-
tified by the borrower's chief financial officer. Both the borrow-
er's accountant and the outside auditor should be required to
certify that the accounts are in fact maintained in accord with
U.S. principals. The accountant should further certify that
bookings are current within 30 days.
The independence of the auditor is clearly of paramount im-
portance6 2 The low bidder is certainly not necessarily the firm
to retain. Ideally, the auditor should be, and usually is, the
project country affiliate of an internationally known firm. In
choosing among several candidates of internationally high re-
pute, the lender would be well advised to select a firm with
which it already has a business relationship. Not only do pre-
62. Accord, J. BAKER AND T. BATES, FINANCING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
OPERATIONS, 127 (1971).
existing relationships take much of the uncertainty out of the
choice, but more importantly, they should provide the investor
with back-up leverage, vis-a-vis the auditor's U.S. office, which
will enable him to obtain fast action and candid answers when
the circumstances of a work-out situation so require. "Where
the investment is a joint venture, it is advisable to include in the
venture agreement a provision stating that either party to the
agreement may at its discretion require that all books of ac-
count, financial records, and other documentation relevant to
venture operations be made available to auditors designated by
such party, so that thorough "spot-checks" can be made at any
time.6
3
Where the investment is a loan, whether to a public or private
entity, the investment agreement must be drafted so that the
obligor is not allowed to divest itself of any material portion of
its assets. If the obligor is a private company, a stated condition
precedent should be that the most recent audited financials
include a break-out of major assets, movable and immovable,
tangible and intangible. This is particularly important if the
loan is being made to a member entity of a corporate group,
where asset shifts may be effected with relative ease by mere
book alterations. If the obligor is a government or governmental
agency, the loan agreement will probably specify that the segre-
gation by the government or agency of any of its foreign ex-
change earnings for the benefit of creditors other than the in-
vestor is a default. In addition, however, the agreement should
also designate as a default the transfer by the obligor of any
material portion of its assets without a proportionate assump-
tion of the investor's obligation by the transferee. Finally,
whether the borrower is public or private, the "use-of-proceeds"
clause should be as specific as possible. Where project loans are
concerned, the device of allowing disbursement only against
specific letters of credit has much to recommend it.
Need for Offshore Collateral
The survey by U.S. counsel of host country statutes and case
law pertinent to work-out conditions, and the modification of
conventional documentation to respond specifically to work-out
problems are necessary steps in the augmenting of investment
security. They are not, however, sufficient. Sufficiency in re-
gard to investment security can only be achieved by maximizing
the investor's access to the obligor's collateral and the exposure
63. A provision of this type was recently included in a major joint venture
agreement concluded by an American company with the Government of Egypt..
[Vol. 5: 305, 1978] The Challenge to Investor's Counsel
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
of that collateral to attachment and levy. If the investment in-
volves a loan to, a guaranty by, or cooperation with a govern-
mental entity, it is particularly important that the collateral be
sited "offshore." If the investment involves only a private pro-
ject or borrower, the collateral must still be effectively reach-
able and should also be located in part outside the project
country.
With respect to LDC governmental obligations, there can be
little doubt that mere contractual undertakings, without more,
are far from sufficient to provide an assurance of prompt,
complete and default-free performance. Some observers have
argued that the prospect of LDC governmental contract viola-
tions should not be exaggerated since such governments clearly
''need" the international equity markets and the multinational
technology exporters too much to risk offending them exces-
sively by wholesale defaults, indiscriminant nationalizations,
and arbitrary guaranty violations. "It should . .. be noted,"
opined one respected observer, "that the need of capital in
underdeveloped countries is not a temporary one. Therefore,
they cannot afford, in the great majority of cases, to alienate
foreign investors by failing to fulfill their promises. ' 64 Another
commentator has more recently written that
[diefaults by sovereign borrowers have occurred, . . . these defaults
have almost always involved a political breakdown .... [T]here is a
tremendous resistance ... to default being allowed to occur, except,
of course, where a new government chooses quite deliberately to cut
itself off from the international market for political and ideological
reasons .... [A] situation would have to be very bad indeed for
default to occur. It certainly is not in the lenders' interest and [it is
doubtful] that a real case can be made for it being in the borrowers'
65
It is, however, becoming increasingly obvious that in actuality
many LDC governments, whether for political, ideological or
other reasons, have little fear of such "market place" reaction.
Some governments have doubtless observed that "even cases of
outright confiscation have a way of being forgotten by future
investors who see themselves in a good bargaining position. '66
64. A. Fatouros, Legal Security for International Investments, LEGAL As-
PECTS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT, 699 (W. Friedman 1959).
65. Parkenham, The Debts of Less Developed Countries-The Challenge
for Commercial Banks, J. OF COM. BANK LENDING, 25-26 (May 1976).
66. Wells, Negotiations with Third World Governments, 1-2 HARV. Bus.
REV. 72-77 (1977).
In the same vein, it has been suggested that even "general legis-
lation may, in practice, give more certainty than ad hoc
contracts that purport to be binding for 15 or more years, but
which in reality are changed as bargaining powers shift. 6 7
Similar conclusions have been drawn with respect to
nationalizations in Africa and could be applied with equal valid-
ity to sovereign defaults, reschedulings, foreign investor
guarantee breaches, and other contractual right violations in
most regions of the underdeveloped world:
In Africa . . . legislative safeguards did not grow out of the local
culture and have not been fully legitimized in their short existence;
international law is regarded as belonging to the rich countries; gun-
boat diplomacy is out of style and economic sanctions are only partial-
ly effective; the damage to investment climate, inflow of foreign in-
vestment, and credit worthiness of the nationalizing country are taken
lightly; the country's honor might be questioned, but not too seriously
since the world realizes that justice may be on the side of the poor
country which is revolting against foreign domination.88
Regardless of the relative validity of the theoretical argu-
ments on this point, there are numerous real-world examples of
situations in which the only compensation received by investors
whose debts have been repudiated, assets seized or contractual
rights violated by host governments has been attributable to the
availability of governmental assets in "off-shore" locations. The
Texaco-LAR Arbitration discussed above provides an excellent
example of the need for investor access to off-shore collateral.
As noted above, the deadline set by the Arbitrator for LAR
compliance with the Arbitration Award came and went with no
indication of any intention on the part of the LAR to comply.
Only when, well after that date, the companies signaled their
intention to interdict the marketing of Libyan crude through
suits in attachment at point-of-sale ports, did Libya agree to
enter into negotiations on compensation. 69
67. Smith & Wells, Mineral Agreements in Developing Countries: Struc-
tures and Substance, 69 THE AM. J. OF INT'L L. (1975).
68. Rood, Compensation of Takeovers in Africa, THE J. OF INT'L L. AND
ECON. 521-522 (1977).
69. Personal interviews by the author. A settlement has recently been
agreed upon pursuant to which the LAR will make payments of $76 million to
each company. It should be noted that the unsuccessful "hot oil" suit brought
against the LAR by a subsidiary of the British Petroleum Company in respect to
expropriations similar to those experienced by TOPCO and CALASIATIC was
different in a material respect from the suits the American companies proposed
to institute. BP had requested and obtained in arbitration not an award of
restitutio in integrum but of damages. The BP litigation claim, which alleged
ownership of the crude oil pumped by the LAR-owned Arab Gulf Exploration
Company, was denied by the court on the grounds that under both Libyan and
Italian law, concessionaires only succeed to the "fruits of the concession" by,
and after, extracting from the earth the resources-28 in question; Since the BP
arbitral award had not purported to restore to BP its position as concessionaire
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Similarly, prior to the settlement negotiated by the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation in 1972 between the post-Al-
lends Government of Chile and the Kennecott Copper Corpora-
tion in respect to the July 1971 expropriation of Sociedad Min-
era El Teniente S.A.,70 virtually the only compensation obtained
by Kennecott, or its operating subsidiary, the Braden Copper
Company, was derived from the sale of ingots Braden was able
to attach and sell at offshore delivery ports.71
In the District Court case7 2 which lead to the Supreme Court's
decision in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc., v. The Republic of
Cuba, et al.,73 the former owners, in this case Cuban nationals
whose cigar factories were expropriated, or "intervened", by
the Castro regime recovered nothing from the Cuban govern-
ment but rather secured partial compensation only by utilizing
the U.S. judicial system to recover from American importers
payments made to the Cuban intervenors for cigars exported
prior to intervention.
Offshore collateral, or "leverage", also provided the only
source of recompense to a\U.S. company whose Ethiopian sub-
sidiary was nationalized by the Mengistu regime in July 1975.
The host government made no attempt to provide compensation
for the takings other than establishing a "compensation
but only to award it damages for loss of that position, the ownership claim could
not be upheld. B.P. Exploration Company (Libya) Limited v. Astro Protector
Compania Naviora, et al, Decision of the Court of Syracusa (Italy), February 15,
1973; 13 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 106, esp. 113-4 (1974).
For additional examples of compensation obtained solely from off-shore
assets see the description of arrangements concluded with the Soviet Union,
Yugoslavia, Romania, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Cuba in H. STEINER & D.
VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS, 433-436 (1976).
70. $67,000,000 Overseas Insurance Settlement Trust, Direct Placement
Memorandum, December 1972, in the author's files, at 1-2.
71. See, Braden Copper Company v. Le Groupment d' Importation des
Metaux, Decision of the Court of Extended Jurisdiction of Paris, 29th Nov. 1972;
12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 182, at 187-98 (1973), upholding Braden's third party
attachment action; but see Sociedad Minera El Teniente S.A. v. Ak-
tiengesellschaft Nordolentsche Affinerie, Decision of the Superior Court of
Hamburg, January 22, 1973; 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 251, esp. 279-81 (1973),
rejecting third party attachment on ground that despite the fact that the El
Teniente expropriation violated German public policy, there was not a suffi-
cient effect upon the German legal system or sufficient violation of German
interests to meet the statutory test which was a precondition to the denial of
effect within Germany of the acts of a foreign sovereign.
72. Mendez v. Gaber, Coe & Gregg, 345 F. Supp. 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
73. 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
committee" which over its more-than-two-year life, did not even
decide on amounts due, much less authorize any payments.
Fortunately for the parent company, prior to the time that its
subsidiary's property was seized, the subsidiary had discounted
with the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia, in return for export
financing, a series of trade acceptances owed to the subsidiary
by the offshore parent. After expropriation, the parent refused
to make payment on the acceptances to the Bank and so avoided
a portion of the loss. Because the Bank had itself been
nationalized in 1972, it would almost certainly be deemed in
litigation to be an organ of the Ethiopian Government, and since
in taking up the acceptances it was engaged in a commercial
rather than a sovereign act, there would appear to be little risk
that a government collection suit against the company would
prove successful.74
A final example of private sector self-help occurred in 1975
when the Continental Grain Company reportedly was able to
force the Government of Zaire to resume payments on a $16
million debt by holding back monthly wheat deliveries to the
main government flour mill, thereby causing "lines and hoard-
ing" at bakeries across the country.75
Explanations for the tendency of government obligors to re-
spond more readily to financial coercion than to contractual
duty are not difficult to educe.
In spite of the provisions in the agreement and the appeals on the
part of the investor for 'sanctity of contract,' it is rare for a major
mining or manufacturing agreement to remain unchanged for more
than a few years....
The terms required to attract an investor are usually quite different
from those required to retain him. Most of his capital, once it is invest-
ed, is captured in the country... [Alny risk and uncertainty recog-
nized by both parties at the outset is forgotten as soon as the project is
visibly successful. As a result, the stage is set for quick renegotiation.
When it sees its interests threatened, the government usually acts
administratively, regardless of the content or omissions of the agree-
ment.76
Other observers have noted with respect to long-term mineral
concessions and development contracts in the less developed
areas of the world that,
... a not unusual feature of their history is that they are renegotiated
by the government over the course of their life. The balance of power
shifts .... [Subsequent to execution of the original agreement,] one
74. Personal interviews by the author.
75. Wash. Post, December 7, 1977, at 1, col. 2.
76. Wells, Negotiating with Third World Governments, 1-2 HARv. Bus. REV.
72-77 (1977).
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finds renegotiations taking place between an increasingly skilled ad-
ministration that knows what it has, believes it could soon run matters
by itself and sees the returns of the investor as exorbitant (forgetting
the original risks run by the firm) and an increasingly vulnerable
outside firm with high sunk costs.
77
In sum, once the investor has made his investment, and as-
suming that he is not in a high-technology industry, 8 he has
little leverage vis-a-vis the host government unless he has the
ability to reach outside the project country for assets owned by
the host government, payments owed to it or supplies which it
needs. Verification of the availability of offshore assets,
whether of a governmental or of a private entity, is therefore a
critical step in the provision of maximum security to the inves-
tor. There is little point in drafting efficient documentation and,
in the event of a work-out, conducting successful litigation or
arbitration, and then finding no assets against which to enforce
the judgment or award.
Location of obligor assets, of course, is only half-and by far
the easier half-of the battle. The assets, once located, must be
reachable by the investor in the event that he is forced to look
outside the project country for satisfaction of his judgment or
arbitral award.
Ideally, the investor should be able to avoid extensive involve-
ment with recognition statutes and bring de novo suits in at-
tachment in the asset jurisdiction itself and levy there without
crossing borders. This is advantageous since just as "it is not
unreasonable to think that an arbitration award connected with
a national legal system may perhaps be easier to enforce [in that
country than elsewhere],' 79 so it is not unreasonable to assume
that it would be easier to enforce a judgment rendered by the
legal system of the asset jurisdiction than one rendered else-
where. In order to achieve some certainty of being able to bring
a successful suit on the agreement in an asset forum, the inves-
77. In the Matter of the Arbitration Between the Anaconda Company and
Chile Copper Company, and Overseas Private Investment Corporation, 29-30,
Case No. 16-10-0071072, American Arbitration Association, (D.C. Opinion, July
17, 1975).
78. A discussion of the relative advantages accruing to high-technology
investors as opposed to low-technology investors is beyond the scope of this
paper but has been amply discussed elsewhere. See, for a brief overview, Why
the Multinational Tide is Ebbing, FORTUNE, Aug. 1977 at 111.
79. Supra note 34, at 11.
tor would have to have a basis of jurisdiction over the defendant
or the res in the jurisdiction in which he believed the obligor's
assets would be likely to be found. The submission-to-juris-
diction clauses contained in conventional investment agree-
ments, whether with private or sovereign obligors, do not gener-
ally provide the investor with the flexibility he requires if he is
to deal with assets wherever they may be found. Coventional
provisions typically recite the obligor's agreement to submit to
suit on the instrument in any of several specified fora, e.g., "any
State or Federal court of or in the State of New York or in any
court in England, the Republic of France, or [the project
country]" and that it waives for itself and its property any de-
fense of, inter alia, lack of jurisdiction, as to those fora. In point
of' fact, however, obligor-related assets, whether movable or
immovable, are likely to be found in any number of other juris-
dictions besides those specified in the submission-to-juris-
diction clause. This is particularly true with respect to movable
assets in the period leading up to and including a work-out.
One solution to the problem was embodied in a document
entitled the Republic of Zaire Agreement drafted in 1975, in-
tended to be used in connection with the financing of a major
developmental project which was ultimately not carried for-
ward. Section 10 of the Agreement provided for submission to
jurisdiction by, and appropriate arrangements for service of
process on, the guarantor,
in any jurisdiction within which any property or asset whatsoever,
tangible or intangible, now or hereafter controlled, owned of record or
owned beneficially by the [guarantor or any agent thereof]... is...
situated on the date of service of process on the [guarantor]...80
The inclusion of a provision of this type would enable the
investor to seek attachment orders in any forum in which he
could locate assets of the investment obligor. If the obligor were
a government it would be necessary in addition to obtain appro-
priate waivers of the act-of-state and sovereign immunity de-
fenses and representations that the government's execution of
the investment agreement was a commercial, rather than
sovereign, act.
Even if these waivers were obtained, of course, it would not be
certain that a sufficient contractual nexus with the forum would
be found by the courts of the particular asset jurisdiction in
which the investor sought to enforce a waiver clause such as
Section 10, supra. Nevertheless, given the increasing tendency
80. "Government of Zaire Agreement" at 14, draft of October 28, 1975, in
the author's files.
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of tribunals in most jurisdictions to give force to the clear agree-
ment of the parties,81 the chances of successful invocation of
such a clause would appear substantial. Certainly, the possible
benefits to be derived from the availability of a "Section 10"
remedy are sufficient to justify a determined effort by counsel
to procure its inclusion in investment documentation wherever
feasible.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing comments make no pretense of being a
comprehensive description of all the steps that should be taken
to guard against adverse work-out developments.
There is no discussion, for example, of the act-of-state or
sovereign immunity issues, since, as was recently stated in Tren-
dex, Ltd. v. Central Bank of Nigeria,82 application of the doc-
81. See, The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Company, 407 U.S. 1, 10, 11 (1972);
(upholding choice of forum clause in international towage contract);
... [S]uch clauses are prima facie valid and should be enforced unless
enforcement is shown by the resisting party to be 'unreasonable' under
the circumstances. [Citation omitted]. We believe this is the correct doc-
trine to be followed by federal district courts sitting in admiralty. It is
merely the other side of the proposition recognized by this Court in
National Equipment Rental Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 US 311 (1964), holding
that in federal courts a party may validly consent to be sued in a juris-
diction where he cannot be found for service of process through
contractual designation of an 'agent' for receipt of process in that juris-
diction. In so holding, the Court stated:
[I]t is settled ... that parties to a contract may agree in advance to
submit to the jurisdiction of a given court, to permit notice to be served
by the opposing party or even to waive notice altogether.' 375 U.S. 311,
315-16. This approach is substantially that followed in other commonlaw
countries including England. [Note omitted]. It is the view advanced by
noted scholars and that adopted by the Restatement of the Conflict of
Laws. [Note omitted]. It accords with ancient concepts of freedom of
contract ....
See also Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 512 (1974), to the same
effect. The Court in Scherk emphasized the need to respect the agreement of the
parties in order to afford them the certainty of forum they bargained for:
A contractual provision specifying in advance the forum in which dis-
putes shall be litigated and the law to be applied is . . . an almost
indispensable precondition to achievement of the orderliness and pre-
dictability essential to any international business transaction.
Nevertheless, it is not unreas9nable to believe that the Court would also enforce
a forum provision that emphasized flexibility, or effectiveness of remedy, rather
than certainty if that is the consideration the parties had bargained for.
82. WEEKLY LAW REPORTS, October 1, 1976, 121 SOLICITOR'S J. 85, February
4, 1977.
The Trendex case was one in which Lord Denning, on behalf of the sitting
Lords, held that the Central Bank of Nigeria would not be entitled to assert the
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trines is quite individualistic as to country, and either doctrine
by itself would be worthy of a full volume of analytical discus-
sion.
These comments are intended, rather, to illustrate the broad
nature of the problems counsel will face in LDC investments,
the general perspective he must apply to structuring the deal,
and the type of arrangements he must make, whether in terms
of controlling local counsel, learning local law, or providing for
offshore collateral, in order to provide for the investor effective
security per se.
These comments, in essence, are intended to demonstrate that
counsel must have good "anticipation" with respect to work-out
problems and know exactly what response will be available in
any given contingency. Unless counsel does have these qualities,
the syndromes subsumed in the terms "mega-deficit" and "de-
stabilized bilateral monopoly" can for the LDC investor over
the coming years mean, at best, serious yield attrition and, at
worst, complete loss of his investment.
defense of sovereign immunity, in a suit brought on an international contract,
where the transaction underlying the contract was essentially commercial,
rather than sovereign, in nature. This decision represented a marked break with
previous British case law on this point, and if sustained, would bring British
practice into harmony with that on the Continent and in the United States.
